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What Humility Isn’t: 
Responsibility and the Judicial Role 
 
 




WHAT IS HUMILITY? 
 
 The Talmud relates a story explaining why the Second Temple was 
destroyed in 70 CE.1  This story centres on a man named Bar Kamtza, who 
was mistakenly invited to a banquet, and a Rabbi, R’Zechariah ben 
Avkulas.   
The host of the banquet had instructed his attendant to bring his 
friend, Kamtza, to the event.  Instead, the attendant brought Bar Kamtza, 
who the Talmud describes as the host’s enemy.  When the host arrived at 
the banquet and found Bar Kamtza, rather than his friend Kamtza, he told 
Bar Kamtza to “get up and get out.”  Bar Kamtza, no doubt seeking to 
avoid embarrassment, offered to pay for his food and drink if only the host 
would let him stay.  When the host refused, Bar Kamtza offered half the 
value of the banquet and, when rebuffed, ultimately offered to pay for the 
entire banquet.  The host again refused, this time grabbing hold of Bar 
Kamtza and physically ejecting him from the event.   
                                                     
* Professor and Associate Dean (Students), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  I am 
grateful to Jamie Shilton for his research assistance and insightful comments in the preparation of 
this piece. 
1 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Gittin, 55b-56a. 
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 Bar Kamtza was offended not only by the rough treatment at the 
hands of the host, but by the fact that the Rabbis looked on without 
intervening or objecting to the host’s conduct: “Bar Kamza said to himself: 
‘Since the Rabbis were seated at the banquet and did not rebuke him for 
the way he treated me, it is evident that what he did was acceptable to 
them.’”2  Bar Kamtza resolved to get revenge against the Rabbis.   
 He went to the leader of the Romans and advised him that the Jews 
were rebelling.  When asked for proof, Bar Kamtza suggested that the 
Romans send an animal as a sacrifice and to watch to see if the Jews would 
offer it up in the Temple.  If they did not, it would be a sure sign of the 
Jews’ resistance.  The Romans sent a calf but, on the way to Jerusalem, Bar 
Kamtza inflicted a subtle blemish on the animal, one that he knew the Jews 
would nevertheless notice and that would render the calf unfit for 
sacrifice.   
 Sure enough, when the sacrifice offering arrived, the blemish was 
noticed and all understood the grave situation.  The Rabbis considered 
offering the animal despite the ritual prohibition, “for the sake of peaceful 
relations with the Roman government.”  But, according to the Talmud, 
Rabbi Zechariah objected that people would then believe that blemished 
animals were fit offerings.  So the Rabbis instead considered killing Bar 
Kamtza so that word of the Rabbis’ refusal to sacrifice the animal would 
not reach the Romans.  Again Rabbi Zechariah objected: people would 
then wrongly believe that the penalty for blemishing a sacrificial animal is 
death.  And so the Rabbis took neither path.  Consistent with Jewish law, 
the animal was not sacrificed.  Bar Kamtza returned to inform the Roman 
authorities.  His plan succeeded: the Romans interpreted the refusal of the 
sacrifice as evidence of the Jews’ rebellion, besieged Jerusalem, and 
destroyed the Holy Temple, a cataclysmic event in the history of the Jewish 
people. 
 The Talmud records that Rabbi Yochanan interrupted his telling of 
these events, offering the following observation: “The humility of Rabbi 
Zechariah ben Avkulas destroyed our Temple, burned down our 
Sanctuary, and exiled us from our land.”3   
                                                     
2 Tractate Gittin, 56a. 
3 Id. 
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* * * 
 
 In recent years academic literature has given some attention to 
humility as an important adjudicative principle or virtue.  In the hands of 
some, the concept is rather thin.  It is merely a synonym for restraint, 
describing a principle of judicial deference to legislative or democratic 
choices or debates.4  For these authors, a judge’s humility is measured 
simply by asking whether and how often she or he is willing to overrule 
or strike down legislation,5 or intervene to decide contentious social 
issues.6  Here, the call for judicial humility is a response to a concern about 
“judicial activism,” sometimes quite neatly folded into polemical 
interventions on particular legal controversies.7 
 The virtue of judicial humility is thickened up by others who regard 
the core of humility as a deep awareness of the fallibility of human 
judgment and the risk of error when met with the difficult, sometimes 
excruciating, choices that must be made by a judge.  Humility is, here, 
about “tempering judicial arrogance”8 and counsels an openness to 
hearing the views of others and listening to the wisdom of other 
authorities and sources.  Simone Chambers builds on this sense of humility 
as an attunement to human fallibility, describing it not only as a question 
related to the imperfection of our knowledge and judgment, but as “an 
acknowledgment of shared human frailty and weakness in the face of 
                                                     
4 Michael J. Gerhardt, “Constitutional Humility” (2007) 76 Cin. L. Rev. 23.   
5 Id. Although Scharffs develops a richer conception of humility, he ultimately also regards 
deference, an allergy to significant change, and avoidance of “activism” as markers for judicial 
humility. Brett Scharffs, “The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom” (1998) 32 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 127. 
6 Richard S. Myers, “The Virtue of Judicial Humility” (2015) 13:2 Ave Maria Law Review 207.   
7 See Id., at 212–213. Myers writes his piece in anticipation of the US Supreme Court’s 
consideration of same sex marriage, hoping to avoid “the distorting effect of the Supreme Court’s 
intervention.” 
8 Michael W. McConnell, “The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on 
Ronald Dworkin’s Moral Reading of the Constitution” (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, at 
1292. 
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contingency and constraint”9 — an attitude that will lead a judge to close 
the imaginative gap between her and an unfortunate person who appears 
before her.10   
 Arguing for the virtue of humility in constitutional discourse, Mark 
Walters builds on this idea of humility as linked to human fallibility and 
frailties in our understanding, as a kind of salve for judicial arrogance.  For 
Walters, “[i]f constitutional law is a moral discourse, and if moral 
discourse embraces moral insight and tragedy simultaneously, then 
constitutional humility is essential.”11  He observes that “[h]umility is not 
often identified as a constitutional value, at least not in the non-aboriginal 
legal tradition.  Law is supposed to be about authority, certainty, and 
order; humility, in contrast, suggests meekness and modesty.”12  To 
embrace humility, in this sense, instills a desire to relate to and understand 
the perspectives of others and a willingness to reconsider one’s past 
decisions.   
The view that humility is, at core, about care and concern for the 
perspectives of others inspires Lindsay Borrows’s reflections on the 
principle of humility.13  In the richest conception available in the existing 
legal literature — enriched by deep engagement with Anishinaabe 
teachings about humility — she describes humility as “a state of being that 
can open hearts and minds to see a situation in different ways.”14  Her 
                                                     
9 Simone Chambers, “Democratizing Humility” (2004) 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 465, at 470–471. 
10 Chambers is writing of the criminal realm, and describes this effect of humility as follows: “we 
are asked to think about our law abidingness as possibly and partially a product of many 
arbitrary, accidental, and contingent factors.  It gives us an impartial perspective on ourselves and 
our own sense of justice." Id., at 471–472.   
11 Mark D. Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 470. 
12 Id., at 474.  In this lovely piece, Walters opposes his view, inspired by the work of John 
Whyte, to that of Ronald Dworkin (as evidenced in Law’s Empire), which shows tremendous 
confidence in the capacity for moral progress through law.   
13 Lindsay Borrows, “Dabaadendiziwin: Practices of Humility in a Multi-Juridical Legal 
Landscape” (2016) 33 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 149.  See also Lindsay Keegitah Borrows, 
Otter’s Journey through Indigenous Language and Law (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2018), at 
136. 
14 Id., at 152. 
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understanding of humility elegantly weaves together many of the threads 
that I have identified:  
Humility is a state of positioning oneself in a way that does 
not favour one's own importance over another's.  Humility 
is a condition of being teachable.  Humility allows us to 
recognize our dependence upon others and to consider their 
perspectives along with our own.  A humble opinion may be 
given in a spirit of deference or submission.  The antonym is 
expressed in terms such as arrogant, elevated, or prideful.15 
This is the “legal principle” of humility that Borrows argues should be 
more actively cultivated in Canadian and Anishinaabe law.   
I, too, have argued for the importance of humility as an adjudicative 
virtue, one that is particularly important in navigating the encounter of 
Canadian constitutionalism with other cultural forms, including religion.16  
The conception of humility that I advanced resonated with the sentiment 
that Robert Cover hoped would install itself in the judge who understood 
that the act of adjudication involves violence to other rich worlds of 
meaning.17  As Judith Resnik explains, Cover “wanted the state’s actors 
(here, its judges and, derivatively, commentators on their work) to be 
uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own power, respectful of the 
legitimacy of competing legal systems, and aware of the possibility that 
multiple meanings and divergent practices ought sometimes to be 
tolerated, even if painfully so.”18  This, too, is a conception of judicial 
humility.   
Together, these richer views offer an appealing set of practices, 
attitudes, and sentiments that would be induced though the cultivation of 
this judicial virtue: modesty, gentleness, awareness of one’s fallibility, an 
openness to learning, curiosity about and engagement with the 
                                                     
15 Id., at 153–154. 
16 Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism 
(Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2015), at 173–177. 
17 Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 
97 Harv. L. Rev. 4. 
18 Judith Resnik, “Living Their legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert 
Cover” (2005) 17 Yale J.L. & Human. 17, at 25. 
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perspectives of others, respect for and deference to other decision-makers 
and institutions.  These are all, surely, features of humility, and all noble 
ones at that.  And yet these understandings of humility have another 
common feature, shared by the thinnest and the thickest alike.  In their 
various ways and despite their differences, all are urging the judge to be, 
in a word, “smaller” — to occupy less space.  Whether merely a pallid 
encoding of a call for restraint in judicial review of legislation or a vibrant 
vision of all that is involved in not becoming enchanted with one’s own 
importance, all principally deploy humility to combat excesses: arrogance, 
self-elevation, and pridefulness.19  This is understandable; those excesses 
are no doubt at work in a judiciary and in need of attention.  There is good 
to be found in encouraging judges to be “smaller,” and framing this in the 
language of humility is effective and compelling.  But I have become 
uncomfortable with the adequacy of this understanding of humility and 
this piece is an exploration of this discomfort. 
The Talmud’s curious tale of Bar Kamtza and Rabbi Zechariah — 
and the arresting conclusion that Rabbi Yochanan draws from it — offers 
a different lesson about the nature of humility.  It suggests that the picture 
of judicial humility painted in the legal commentary is not only 
incomplete, but even potentially dangerous in its incompleteness.  Rabbi 
Yochanan’s statement is perplexing by the light of these conventional 
conceptions of humility.  On these accounts, humility is a good to be 
pursued, particularly by those in authority.  How could one of the defining 
tragedies of the history of the Jews be laid at the feet of humility?  Yet Rabbi 
Yochanan seems to conclude both that Rabbi Zechariah acted with 
humility and that this exercise of humility was the cause of the destruction 
of the second temple and the exile of the Jewish people.  Rabbi Zechariah 
did not assume authority beyond the letter of the law, nor did he arrogate 
to himself the task of deciding this crucial question facing the Jewish 
people.  He simply explained what the law said and let events unfold.  He 
was small.  But this was precisely his error of humility.   
The lesson of this puzzling episode in the Talmud is that humility 
is not merely the opposite of pride, arrogance, or self-importance.  Though 
                                                     
19 Although this is the focus of Borrows’s treatment of humility, she alludes to the dimension of 
humility that is my focus in this piece when she notes that “[s]pace must be taken up as 
necessary, just as it must be given away at times as well.” Borrows, supra note 14, at 157.  
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these attitudes, and the habits that follow from them, are all inconsistent 
with humility, they all flow from a common and more fundamental source: 
a flawed sense of oneself and one’s position in relation to others.  This is 
the essential pathology that signals a failure of humility.  Rabbi Zechariah 
acted modestly, but, as one commentator puts it, “[h]is sense of himself 
was flawed because he saw himself as less capable than he actually was of 
solving a real-life dilemma of great consequence.”20  The failure in Rabbi 
Zechariah’s humility was that he resiled from the decision, with disastrous 
consequences.  In this respect, both arrogance and diffidence can be 
understood as problems of ego because both flow from placing the self too 
much as the centre of things — one resulting in the elevation above others, 
the other in the negation of responsibility towards them.  Humility is, thus, 
better understood as attunement to one’s appropriate position and role in 
a web of relationships with others.  Drawing from this story, it might be 
said that humility also involves an awareness of power, of the 
consequences of power for others, and assuming one’s appropriate place 
in the exercise of that power.  It is a virtue based in awareness of and 
responsibility to others, not merely the antithesis of arrogance or certainty.  
Or, if you prefer, it is not about being as small as you can be, it is about 
taking an appropriate amount of space.   
It is this feature of humility — awareness of one’s role and position 
in respect of power and willingness to accept the burdens of responsibility 
that flow from this — that I want to isolate and explore in this piece, 
seeking to complete the picture of what judicial humility might entail.   
With prevailing understandings of judicial humility in hand — and 
at a time when case names like Insite,21 Carter,22 and Bedford23 ring in our 
ears — it might seem counterintuitive to reflect on the way in which Chief 
Justice McLachlin and the McLachlin Court evidenced the virtue of 
                                                     
20 Alan Morinis, Everyday Holiness: The Jewish Spiritual Path of Mussar (Boston & London: 
Trumpeter, 2007), at 49. 
21 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 
3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”].  
22 Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Bedford”]. 
23 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Carter”]. 
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humility in currents of the criminal justice jurisprudence.  But that is 
precisely what I hope to do, focussed instead on this particular feature or 
understanding of humility that I have drawn out in this first part of this 
paper.  In the next section I will look at three somewhat less celebrated 
cases that show this facet of judicial humility at work.  And yet my claim 
is most certainly not triumphal or apologetic, suggesting that this 
conception of humility was fully or evenly realized in Chief Justice 
McLachlin’s work or that of the McLachlin court.  I am drawing out an 
ethical resource in the jurisprudence, something I take to be a noble 
component of the judicial role, and one that I think should be more sharply 
noted and cultivated, alongside the important aspects of humility that 
Walters, Borrows, and other “rich theorists” of humility have identified.  
And so the penultimate section will identify an area in the criminal justice 
system in which there have been meaningful failures of the humility 
involved in mindful positioning and acceptance of the burdens of 
responsibility. 
 
THE SHAPE OF JUDICIAL HUMILITY 
 
 I turn now to consider how this understanding of humility as a 
complex virtue involving awareness of one’s appropriate position and 
responsibilities in relationship with others can find expression in the 
judicial role.  The cases below are drawn from decisions of the Supreme 
Court concerning the criminal justice system because it is an area of law 
that seems particularly, if not uniquely, adept at drawing the complex 
burdens of the judicial role into high relief.  I offer each case study as a site 
for exposing and exploring the juridical expression of the facet of humility 
that is of interest to me in this piece: its relationship to responsibility.  The 
salutary attitudes and practices that other writers have associated with 
humility are also variously at work in these cases.  My point is that a 
satisfying conception of the virtue of judicial humility involves embedding 
these attitudes and practices of modesty within an awareness of role and 
relationships, with particular attentiveness to power and its consequences, 
along with a willingness to accept the associated burdens of judgment. 
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Humility, Responsibility, and Vulnerability 
 
 Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)24 brought 
before the Court the constitutionality of Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code,25 
the part of Code that governs the treatment of accused persons found not 
criminal responsible by reason of mental disorder (“NCR accused”).  
Parliament enacted Part XX.1 in 1991 in response to the decision in Swain,26 
in which the Court ruled unconstitutional the prior scheme by which 
accused found “not guilty by reason of insanity” would be detained 
automatically and indefinitely at the “pleasure of the Lieutenant 
Governor.”  Part XX.1 instituted sweeping revisions to the treatment of 
mentally disordered offenders, including the introduction of a new verdict 
that was neither “guilty” nor “not guilty” but, rather, “not criminally 
responsible.”  But it was the new approach to treatment, detention, and 
restrictions on liberty that was at issue in Winko.  Under Part XX.1, a court 
or, more commonly, a Review Board is required to make a determination 
as to whether the NCR accused should be discharged absolutely (thereby 
releasing him or her from the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system), 
discharged with conditions, or detained in custody in a hospital.  In 
coming to this decision, a Review Board is required to take into 
consideration “the need to protect the public from dangerous persons, the 
mental condition of the accused, the reintegration of the accused into 
society and the other needs of the accused”.  Mr. Winko objected that this 
scheme — as interpreted to that point — presumed the dangerousness of 
the NCR accused and placed on that accused the burden of proving the 
contrary, in contravention of his section 7 and 15(1) rights. 
 Although the case raised constitutional issues, it turned on a 
question of statutory interpretation: Did Part XX.1, indeed, create such a 
presumption of dangerousness?27  The focal point of the case was section 
                                                     
24 [1999] S.C.J. No. 31, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Winko”].   
25 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. 
26 R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.).  
27 Although this was the core issue, Winko is more generally, a touchstone case establishing the 
posture that the Canadian criminal justice system would take toward those who, by reason of 
mental disorder, cannot be held criminally responsible. Justice McLachlin explains, for example, 
that the sole basis for the justice system’s claim over the NCR accused is danger to the public 
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672.54(a), which states that “where a verdict of not criminally responsible 
on account of mental disorder has been rendered in respect of the accused 
and, in the opinion of the court or Review Board, the accused is not a 
significant threat to the safety of the public,” the Review Board must, “by 
order, direct that the accused be discharged absolutely.”  And to put a fine 
point on it, the central question was, What should a Review Board do in a 
condition of uncertainty about whether the accused is a significant threat to 
the safety of the public?  If the evidence supports a positive finding that 
the accused is a significant threat to the safety of the public, the result was 
clear: the accused should not be discharged absolutely.  Equally clear was 
that if a Review Board concluded that the NCR accused was not such a 
threat, he or she should be discharged absolutely.  But what if the evidence 
couldn’t support a clear finding in one direction or another?   
 Justice Gonthier (with whom L’Heureux Dubé J. concurred) held 
that if a Review Board finds that if there is uncertainty as to whether an 
NCR accused who presents some danger to the public is a significant threat, 
that NCR accused should be subject to conditions or detained.  Perhaps 
more time and future information would resolve the issue, but in the 
meantime the criminal justice system should retain its warrant over the 
mentally ill individual.  Justice Gonthier defended this as the plain 
meaning of the text.  By contrast, Justice McLachlin, as she then was and 
writing for the majority, effectively denied that there was space for such 
uncertainty or indecision.  If the Review Board could not conclude that the 
NCR accused presented a significant threat to the safety of the public, the 
decision was made: the individual must be discharged unconditionally.   
 In arriving at this conclusion, Justice McLachlin’s reasons faithfully 
express the extraordinarily difficult nature of the choice facing a criminal 
justice system and, on an individual basis, each Review Board: “In every 
society there are those who commit criminal acts because of mental illness.  
The criminal law must find a way to deal with these people fairly, while 
protecting the public against further harms.  The task is not an easy one.”28  
The gravest concerns lie in each direction.  There would be considerable 
solace to be found in some room for indecision.  One could perhaps 
                                                     
and that the orientation of the Part XX.1 approach is towards assessment and treatment, not 
punishment. 
28 Winko, supra note 24, at para. 1.  
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imagine a review board member, taking her cue from Rabbi Zachariah, 
objecting alternatively, “but if we discharge this person, they might cause 
harm to someone!” and “but if we don’t discharge this person, we have 
deprived them of their basic liberty without justification!”.  Justice 
McLachlin denies the decision-maker this comfort.  She explains that 
“however difficult the task, the court or Review Board cannot avoid the 
responsibility of making that determination.”29   
 Humility understood solely in terms of awareness of fallibility and 
embrace of uncertainty would not dictate this approach.  But I read Justice 
McLachlin’s conclusion in Winko as a fine instantiation of the more 
complete picture of humility that I have been urging.  Consistent with 
prevailing accounts of humility, her reasons in Winko are rich with an 
attempt to understand the lives of others.  She reflects on the circumstances 
that brought Mr. Winko before the courts and insists on moving past 
stereotypes about the dangerousness of the mentally ill and thinking 
realistically about their lives, noting that evidence does not support the 
proposition that NCR accused are more likely than others to commit future 
offences.30  She is seeking to engage compassionately with the perspectives 
and experiences of others.  But she also, and crucially, emphasizes the 
unique vulnerability of the mentally ill in our society and in relation to our 
justice system.  Justice McLachlin notes the “socially marginalizing side-
effects”31 of mental illness.  She observes the historical mistreatment of the 
mentally ill who “have long been subject to negative stereotyping and 
social prejudice in our society based on an assumption of 
dangerousness”.32  And she refers explicitly to the fact that “the mentally 
ill are often vulnerable and victimized in the prison setting, as well as by 
changes in the health system that many suggest result in greater numbers 
of the mentally ill being caught up in the criminal process”.33   
 Justice McLachlin is, here, drawing herself and the court or Review 
Board facing this admittedly difficult choice into explicit awareness of the 
                                                     
29 Id., at para. 51. 
30 Id., at para. 37. 
31 Id., at para. 37. 
32 Id., at para. 35. 
33 Id., at para. 41.  
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power dynamics and vulnerabilities that shape that moment, as well as the 
enormous consequences of the decision for the affected communities.  
With this she is inducing a keener appreciation of the role and 
responsibilities of the decision-maker, burdensome though they may be.  
The overriding duty of the decision-maker in this situation is to ensure that 
the NCR accused is “treated with the utmost dignity and afforded the 
utmost liberty compatible with his or her situation.”34  Attunement to the 
vulnerability of the mentally ill, the consequences for them of the exercise 
of the criminal law’s power, and one’s unique position standing between 
that power and consequence, require the acceptance of this duty.  This is 
so despite how much one might prefer not to make the decision, to protect 
oneself from the burden of that choice.  And this, it seems to me, is a true 
counsel of humility. 
 Winko thus serves as an example that evidence of the virtue of 
judicial humility is not found merely in a refusal to invalidate legislation, 
though with her interpretation of Part XX.1 in hand, McLachlin J. found 
the legislation constitutionally valid.  It is a much more complicated matter 
than that, one that involves a judge positioning herself within a web of 
relationships with others.  And in pursuing the virtue of judicial humility, 
those salient relationships are much broader than solely those between the 
judiciary and the other branches of government.  The judge is a responsible 
member of a more complex community than that, and with more complex 
duties.  In Winko, Justice McLachlin was keenly aware that this community 
of regard included those suffering with mental illness and that the Court’s 
decision would have profound impacts on their lives, as well as the safety 
of the public.  In this, she not only asked courts and Review Boards to 
accept the burdens of their responsibilities, she humbly did so herself.  
 
Humility, Responsibility, and History 
 
 A judge working with the common law is engaged in a relationship 
with history.  When that judge confronts a legal rule or principle applicable 
to a given case before her, she is, in that moment, participating in the 
unfolding of a tradition.  With this, she faces the formidable question: 
                                                     
34 Id., at para. 42. 
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Receiving, through this rule or principle, the accumulated wisdom of past 
experience and judgment, what is my appropriate relationship to this 
history as I wrestle with contemporary circumstances and the case before 
me?  Principles of stare decisis and adherence to precedent embody one 
stance with respect to this question — one posture towards this legal 
history — and shape the inherently conservative dimension of the 
common law.  Here, the judge’s role is to receive the wisdom of past 
decisions and draw them forward to the present.  But of course change is 
also a genetic aspect of the common law and the source of its dynamism.  
This facet of the common law reflects a fundamental understanding that, 
as Michael Oakeshott puts it, “[t]here is nothing to encourage us to believe 
that … what is better survives more readily than what is worse”35 and that, 
as society changes and new circumstances emerge, history cannot exhaust 
our insight about justice.  And so to bring this question into the terms of 
this piece, one might ask, What does judicial humility mean or demand for 
this engagement with history?  
 This question frames my examination of Justice McLachlin’s (as she 
then was) decision in R. v. Khan,36 a decision that, in terms of its effects on 
our legal system, must be considered one of the most important and 
consequential of her career.  Khan concerned the admissibility of a young 
child’s unsworn statements, made to her mother, regarding a sexual 
assault.  Although the Court’s decision, authored by McLachlin J., clarified 
certain points about the approach to the testimonial competence of 
children, the crucial intervention of the case was on the analysis of hearsay.  
The child, T., was three and a half years old at the time of the incident.  She 
had gone to the doctor with her mother.  The doctor, Dr. Khan, first 
examined T. with her mother in the room.  While her mother changed for 
her own examination, T. was alone with Dr. Khan in his office.  After the 
examination, when the mother rejoined T., she noticed that the child was 
picking at a wet spot on her sleeve.  Approximately 15 minutes after 
leaving Dr. Khan, the mother asked T. what she and Dr. Khan talked about 
when they were alone.  The young girl then conveyed that Dr. Khan asked 
her if she wanted a candy, then told her to open her mouth and “put his 
                                                     
35 Michael Oakeshott, “The Character of a University Education” in Luke O’Sullivan, ed, What is 
HIstory? and other essays (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 373, at 377. 
36 [1990] S.C.J. No. 81, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khan”]. 
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birdie in my mouth, shook it and peed in my mouth.”37  The mother 
testified that “birdie” was T.’s word for “penis”.  The police were called, 
the spot on the sleeve was examined and found to be a deposit of semen, 
and Dr. Khan was charged with sexual assault.   
The evidentiary difficulty that became the legal core of Khan was 
that the trial judge found that T., only approximately four and a half years 
old at the time of the trial, was not competent to testify.  This meant that 
the key evidence — what T. said to her mother about what occurred — 
could only be presented to the court through the mother, making it hearsay 
and, therefore, presumptively inadmissible.  Finding no applicable 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, the trial judge excluded this crucial 
evidence and acquitted the accused.  The Crown appealed and the case 
found its way to the Supreme Court.  
Justice McLachlin corrected certain errors in the trial judge’s 
competency analysis, but the central question of the hearsay remained.  
And the core difficulty was this: Justice McLachlin concluded that the trial 
judge was right that no traditional hearsay exceptions applied and was 
therefore correct that the statements were inadmissible on the basis of 
prevailing hearsay rules.  The choice before the Court was, therefore, to 
stand by these hearsay rules, which reflect an historical set of judgments 
about the safety of relying on certain types of information, or to reshape 
the rule.  The matter drew particular importance from the context in which 
it appeared, namely the prosecution of an alleged sexual offence against a 
young child, a category of vulnerable persons from whom direct evidence 
would often be difficult to obtain in court.  Justice McLachlin framed the 
essential issue before the Court as follows:  
The question then is the extent to which, if at all, the 
strictures of the hearsay rule should be relaxed in the case of 
children’s testimony.  The issue is one of great importance in 
view of the increasing number of prosecutions for sexual 
offences against children and the hardships that often attend 
requiring children to retell and relive the frequently 
traumatic events surrounding the episode in a long series of 
                                                     
37 Id., at para. 4. 
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encounters with parents, social workers, police and finally 
different levels of courts.38 
 Attuned to this practical context, McLachlin J. acknowledged that 
the “hearsay rule has traditionally been regarded as an absolute rule, 
subject to various categories of exceptions” and that this approach 
“provided a degree of certainty to the law on hearsay”.39  However she 
concluded that the approach “has frequently proved unduly inflexible in 
dealing with new situations and new needs in the law.”40  For the purposes 
of this piece, a moment in the flow of her reasoning stands out.  In 
reviewing the case of Ares v. Venner,41 which provided some support for 
the approach she would take, she paused to emphasize a line that the 
Court had accepted from a dissenting judgment penned by Lord Donovan 
in a 1965 English case, Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions:  “The 
common law is moulded by the judges and it is still their province to adapt 
it from time to time so as to make it serve the interests of those it binds.”42   
So Justice McLachlin counselled a return to the “principle and the 
policy underlying the hearsay rule rather than the strictures of traditional 
exceptions.”43  She excavated the historical decisions to expose the core 
concerns animating the hearsay prohibition, namely that hearsay evidence 
might not be necessary and might be unreliable, and concluded that 
hearsay statements made by children regarding crimes committed against 
the child should therefore be admitted if they are, indeed, necessary and 
reliable.44  T.’s mother’s evidence should have been admitted: it was 
necessary, the child having been ruled incompetent to testify, and the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, features of the 
statement, and the corroborative evidence gave her hearsay statement the 
                                                     
38 Id., at para. 17.  
39 Id., at para. 18. 
40 Id. 
41 [1970] S.C.R. 608, [1970] R.C.S. 608 (S.C.C.). 
42 Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881, [1965] A.C. 1001, at 1047 
(H.L.).   
43 Khan, supra note 36 at para. 18. 
44 And “subject to such safeguards as the judge may consider necessary and subject always to 
considerations affecting the weight that should be accorded to such evidence.” Id., at para. 33. 
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stamp of reliability.  Subsequent cases would recognize that the logic of 
McLachlin J.’s approach could not be contained to the case of child 
witnesses, and that the principled approach to hearsay — focussing on 
necessity and reliability — would define the whole of the Court’s 
subsequent hearsay jurisprudence.45   
But what informed Justice McLachlin’s decision to reshape the 
approach to hearsay in Khan?  The law of evidence occupies a special place 
in the landscape of our justice system: it is the law’s practical epistemology, 
its way of knowing the social world that it is asked to judge.  As such, there 
is no path to a just outcome that can bypass the gates of evidence law.  
Chief Justice McLachlin was keenly attuned to this structural significance 
of our rules of evidence and her formidable contributions to the field of 
evidence law should be counted amongst her most important.  In Khan she 
was specifically attentive to the practical consequences of the law for those 
who it would affect, here vulnerable children.  And as evidenced by her 
invocation of Lord Donovan’s dissent in Myers, this awareness of the 
consequences of her decision was married with a keen appreciation of her 
role as a judge in relationship not only to inherited wisdom and rules, but 
the communities affected by her decision.   
If not the starting point — a matter on which there is substantial 
(though inconsequential) academic debate — Justice McLachlin’s 
conceptual move in Khan was the watershed for what is considered the 
“principled revolution” in the modern Canadian evidence law.  It 
reshaped our approach to evidence.  Far from modest in its effect, the 
decision nevertheless showed humility because it involved a judge’s 
thoughtful reflection on her role and responsibilities in the web of 
relationships and lived experiences in which she discharges her duties.  
Those relationships importantly include a relationship with history and 
the wisdom generated through historical experience.  Although adherence 
to inherited rules and principles in light of the weight of that history might 
be more consistent with the lack of arrogance and modesty often 
associated with humility, it is not a reflection of the more complex picture 
of the virtue that I have been urging in this piece.  As a judge, it is not 
                                                     
45 The general applicability of her approach to hearsay was explicitly recognized in R. v. Smith, 
[1992] S.C.J. No. 74, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.), and would carry through to our guiding 
jurisprudence today (see R. v. Bradshaw, [2017] S.C.J. No. 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865 (S.C.C.)).   
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enough to receive and apply rules and laws, as Rabbi Zechariah did.  Nor 
can they be callously disregarded as if the experience and wisdom that 
generated them has no claim on us.  Both approaches lack humility 
because both fail to occupy appropriate space.  Khan is an example that 
shows that we find judicial humility at the confluence of respectful 
engagement with history and awareness of the responsibilities of one’s 
role in the moment.  This is perhaps one of the defining burdens we ask a 
judge to accept: to wrestle with history, not just to receive it.   
 
Humility, Responsibility, and the Role of Others 
 
 The combined effect of R. v. Nur46 and R. v. Lloyd,47 both with 
majority decisions penned by Chief Justice McLachlin, has been to sound 
the death knell for most mandatory minimum sentences.  In Lloyd, she 
explains that “the reality” is that mandatory minimum sentences 
applicable to a breadth of circumstances and possible offenders are 
constitutionally vulnerable “because such laws will almost inevitably 
include an acceptable reasonable hypothetical for which the mandatory 
minimum will be found unconstitutional.”48  She goes on to suggest that if 
Parliament wishes to persist in the use of mandatory minimums, it must 
more narrowly circumscribe their applicability or offer a legislative “safety 
valve” to judges.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent jurisprudence on 
the question of the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences 
thus hardly seems a promising archive for reflection on the judicial virtue 
of humility, as it is often understood.  Nur and Lloyd are large, bold, 
confident —  to some, institutionally arrogant — decisions.  But the axial 
jurisprudential moment leading to these cases, R. v. Ferguson,49 is a 
decision that indeed discloses dimensions of the more complex picture of 
humility that I am developing here.   
                                                     
46 [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”]. 
47 [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lloyd”].   
48 Id., at para. 35.   
49 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”].   
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 The case came from Chief Justice McLachlin’s home town, Pincher 
Creek, Alberta, and involved the fatal shooting of a police detainee by an 
RCMP constable.  Constable Ferguson would later testify that while 
placing the detainee, Mr. Varley, in cells, Varley attacked him, pulling his 
vest over his head and grabbing Cst. Ferguson’s firearm.  In the ensuing 
struggle, one shot was discharged into the detainee’s stomach, wounding 
him.  The booking officer would testify that he heard the second, and fatal, 
headshot up to three seconds later. 
At issue was the constitutionality of the four year mandatory 
minimum sentence for manslaughter with a firearm.  Ferguson did not 
challenge the general constitutionality of the minimum but, rather, argued 
that, as applied to his circumstances, this four year minimum constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 12, and that the 
appropriate remedy would be a constitutional exemption granted 
pursuant to the wide remedial power conferred on courts by section 24(1) 
of the Charter.  Chief Justice McLachlin found no basis for concluding that 
the four year mandatory minimum sentence offended section 12 on the 
(distinctly unsympathetic) facts of this case.  Nevertheless, and though a 
decision on this point was not strictly required given her finding on the 
section 12 question, McLachlin C.J.C. turned to what would be the key 
question in the case: what is the appropriate remedy when a violation of 
section 12 is, indeed, found?  Should that law “be permitted to stand 
subject to constitutional exemptions in particular cases”, granted pursuant 
to section 24(1) of the Charter, as Ferguson had argued, or is “the only 
remedy … a declaration that the law is inconsistent with the Charter and 
hence falls under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982”?50   
Chief Justice McLachlin held that courts should not grant 
constitutional exemptions pursuant to their section 24(1) remedial power.  
Section 24(1), she explained, is to be used in response to government acts 
that violate Charter rights.51  If, by contrast, it is a law that offends the 
Charter, courts are limited to “striking down” the law as being of no force 
and effect under section 52.   
                                                     
50 Id., at para. 34. 
51 Id., at para. 61. 
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At the time, some viewed this conclusion in Ferguson as 
representing the Court’s unfortunate withdrawal from its appropriate role 
in relieving particular instances of injustice arising from mandatory 
minimum sentences.  Constitutional exemptions offered “a workable 
solution to the problem of the exceptional case”52 and some worried that 
Ferguson marked a retreat from close scrutiny of minimum sentences.  And 
yet in retrospect, Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasons in Ferguson are better 
read as a muscular intervention in the politics and legality of mandatory 
minimum sentences,53 setting the stage for Nur and Lloyd.  She denied 
judges the easy way out — episodically releasing tensions while sustaining 
the law produced by the politics of mandatory minimums.  Far from an 
abdication of the necessary role of the courts, the decision served as an 
encouragement to judges to take the step required of them given their 
constitutional role: to recognize that a law that would inflict cruel or 
unusual punishment lacks the political morality within the structure of our 
constitutional order to stand as law.  The world announced in Lloyd — one 
in which mandatory minimum sentences are all constitutionally suspect 
— is a world that Ferguson made.   
But what does this all have to do with humility?  The answer lies in 
how Chief Justice McLachlin arrived at this conclusion in Ferguson.  
Acknowledging the appeal of constitutional exemptions as a more surgical 
and flexible response to the excesses of mandatory minimum sentences, 
her rejection of this approach was very much anchored in a concern about 
the potential for interference with the appropriate role of Parliament.  She 
notes that constitutional exemptions, though they might initially appear 
less intrusive, “may in fact represent an inappropriate intrusion on the 
legislature’s role”54 inasmuch as their use would effectively amend the 
                                                     
52 Lisa Dufraimont, "R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a Coherent Approach to Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences under Section 12" (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 459 at 470.  See also Peter W. 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf ed., vol. 2 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007), 
at 40-21.  Hogg approved of the use of constitutional exemptions in minimum sentence cases, 
saying that there was “much to be said for it” in that “[i]t would enable the courts to keep in force 
a minimum sentence that was not disproportionate in the great majority of its applications, while 
applying normal sentencing principles to the rare set of facts where the defendant’s lack of moral 
culpability would make the minimum sentence cruel and unusual.” 
53 I suggested this interpretation of Ferguson in “A More Lasting Comfort?  The Politics of 
Minimum Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101. 
54 Ferguson, supra note 49, at para. 50. 
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legislation by conferring a discretion on judges that Parliament did not 
intend.  This concern sounds in a register consonant with familiar 
understandings of judicial humility — that it involves judicial withdrawal 
and restraint in order to allow free space for Parliament’s judgments.  The 
problem with resting on this reading of the Chief Justice’s concerns is it 
fails to account for the transformative role that Ferguson would come to 
play in the field.   
In fact, the spirit of Chief Justice’s concern about interference with 
Parliament’s role is not solely, or even primarily, animated by an attitude 
of deference.  As she reflects on what the Constitution and the rule of law 
say about the responsibility of courts when faced with unconstitutional 
legislation, the picture becomes more complex and interesting.  The 
Constitution, she says, gives a clear answer to what a court must do with 
an unconstitutional law: it must be declared of no force or effect.  This is 
important to Chief Justice McLachlin because, the unconstitutional 
provision having been struck down, “the ball is thrown back into 
Parliament’s court, to revise the law, should it choose to do so, so that it no 
longer produces unconstitutional effects.”55  And as she considers the 
responsibility of courts, she turns to their central role in guarding the rule 
of law, and observes that providing constitutional exemptions not only 
produces lack of clarity and predictability at the formal level but that “the 
divergence between the law on the books and the law as applied — and 
the uncertainty and unpredictability that result — exacts a price paid in 
the coin of injustice.”56  This divergence impairs the right of citizens to 
know the law, risks the overapplication of unjust laws, and creates barriers 
to the realization of the rights of those subject to the authority of these 
laws.   
Having canvassed these various role and mandates, Chief Justice 
McLachlin’s reasons culminate in a way that sheds light on her 
fundamental concern about the relationship between Parliament and the 
courts, and with it on what a humble acceptance of responsibility in 
relation to the role of others demands.  It is not that the courts must 
withdraw and exercise restraint in order to allow Parliament open space 
in which to act.  Rather, a court must do its own job boldly and effectively 
                                                     
55 Id., at para. 65. 
56 Id., at para. 72. 
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— it must strike down unconstitutional laws — in order to make the shape 
of Parliament’s role and responsibilities, in light of the real consequences 
of its decisions, clear to Parliament itself.  This is the very note on which 
she concludes her analysis: “Bad law, fixed up on a case-by-case basis by 
the courts, does not accord with the role and responsibility of Parliament 
to enact constitutional laws for the people of Canada.”57  In Ferguson, 
McLachlin C.J.C. was concerned with the courts’ relationship to 
Parliament, but the point is more broadly applicable.  Responsibly 
occupying one’s appropriate space —the heart of humility — is, in fact, an 
exercise in calling for others to do the same.   
This is precisely what Rabbi Zechariah failed to do.  But the Talmud 
relates another curious reflection on the nature of humility that captures 
this dimension of the virtue, richly understood.  Rabbi Chelbo recounts 
that Rav Huna once said, “Anyone who sets a particular place for himself 
to pray in the synagogue, the God of Abraham stands in his aid, and when 
he dies, people say of him, ‘This was a humble person.’”58  How can it be 
that reliably occupying a spot in the synagogue is an expression of 
humility?  Perhaps the answer is that it clarifies the shape of things for 
others as they seek to responsibly occupy their own space.   
 
POLICE POWERS AND FAILURES OF JUDICIAL HUMILITY 
 
 Thus far this piece has been concerned with exposing a different 
face of judicial humility.  I have done so by looking to three judgments 
penned by Chief Justice McLachlin, together displaying a more complex 
picture of humility as the effort to assume one’s appropriate place in 
relationship with others, attuned to the workings of power and history, the 
vulnerabilities of those around us, and a particular form of attentiveness 
to the roles of others.  The attitudes, sentiments, and practices associated 
with the more common picture of humility — such as awareness of 
fallibility, compassion, openness to learning, and modesty — are really just 
aspects of this more complete understanding of humility.  And as these 
three cases drawn from aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
                                                     
57 Id., at para. 73. 
58 Tractate B’rachot 6b, translation taken from Morinis, supra note 20, at 49. 
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criminal justice system show, sometimes that practice requires asserting 
oneself and confidently assuming one’s proper space, not simply being as 
small as one can be.    
 But this is just an ethical resource to be found in the case law.  The 
cases are examples from a complex and vast jurisprudence that is also 
filled with counter examples.  The attitude and practice of humility I have 
developed here is at work and available in the Court’s jurisprudence and 
in Chief Justice McLachlin’s work, but it would be too much to say that it 
defines either.  Indeed, having found this important ethical thread within 
McLachlin C.J.C.’s jurisprudence concerning the criminal justice system, it 
is also in this field that I find a body of law that displays the failing of this 
form of humility.  Humility is a virtue to be worked towards, not an 
already-realized feature of the Supreme Court’s work or that of any given 
judge of the Court.  It is therefore important to point to where the 
dimensions of humility at play in cases like Winko, Khan, and Ferguson have 
been absent, and with pernicious consequences for our law and those it 
affects.   
 Over the last many years, the Court has benefitted from a 
developing narrative about its progressive, skeptical take on the 
expansions of crime and punishment.  Cases like Insite, Bedford, and Carter 
have shown the Court’s concern about the scope of the criminal law and 
the limits of criminalization.  The Court’s jurisprudence on mandatory 
minimum sentences that I have touched on in this piece, most notably Nur 
and Lloyd, and to some extent its attention to the insidious character of the 
overincarceration of Indigenous peoples,59 has evidenced similar concern 
and an inclination toward restraint in respect of sentencing and 
punishment.  All of these decisions have shown elements of the regard for 
the experience and vulnerability of those subject to the law, and sensitivity 
to the consequential responsibilities and burdens of the judiciary, that is 
sonorous with the dimensions of humility that I have drawn out in this 
piece.  As a result of this jurisprudence in substantive criminal law and 
punishment, in recent years the court has sometimes been positioned as 
the counterweight to a government with a “tough on crime” agenda. 
                                                     
59 See, e.g. R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 
S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”]. 
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 Yet over that same timespan there has been a quiet but powerful 
countercurrent in the Court’s work in criminal justice: the steady 
expansion of police powers and contraction of the pre-trial rights of the 
accused.  Indeed, one might observe that the progress and gains in 
substantive criminal law and punishment, though hugely significant in 
their domain, are somewhat “boutique” in nature, touching chiefly on 
“grossly disproportionate” mandatory minimum sentences (which is a 
fragment of the day-to-day punishment imposed by our criminal justice 
system)60 and on the limitation of a set of offences that represent a small 
component of the work done in our courts.  When one turns to the vast 
world of low-level, daily interactions between individuals and the police 
— the world that fundamentally shapes communities’ experience of the 
criminal justice system —  the picture looks very different indeed.  In a 
series of deeply split decisions, a majority of the Court has either expanded 
police powers or interpreted the scope of rights in a way that is highly 
solicitous of those powers.   
 One might point to a number of cases to identify this other face of 
the Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence,61 but consider just three: R. v. 
Singh,62 R. v. Sinclair,63 and R. v. Clayton and Farmer.64  Chief Justice 
McLachlin was in the majority in each.  In Singh the Court was asked to 
consider the scope of the right to silence in a circumstance in which the 
accused had repeatedly asserted his right and expressed his desire not to 
speak with the police.  The police nevertheless persisted and obtained 
incriminating information as a result.  With the forceful objection of four 
judges of the Court who were concerned that this evacuated the right for 
those under the “dominance or control”65 of the police, the majority of the 
Court held that the right to silence protected a “meaningful choice whether 
                                                     
60 By definition, indeed, this jurisprudence leaves the “merely disproportionate” sentence wholly 
untouched, though such a sentence is unjust by the Criminal Code’s own standards. 
61 Other examples include R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Spencer”]; R. v. Saeed, [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 518 (S.C.C.). 
62 [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]. 
63 [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sinclair”]. 
64 [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clayton”]. 
65 Singh, supra note 62, at para. 66. 
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to speak or to remain silent”66 and that, in the police interrogation setting, 
as long as the accused’s statement was not rendered “involuntary” in the 
meaning of the common law confessions rule,67 that accused should be 
viewed as having made a real choice.   
In Sinclair, the majority rejected the dissenting view that 
understood the section 10(b) right to counsel as designed to “restore a 
power-imbalance between the detainee and the police in the coercive 
atmosphere of the police investigation",68 instead seeing the right as chiefly 
informational in character, intended to give “the detainee the information 
he needs to make a meaningful choice as to whether to cooperate with the 
investigation or decline to do so.”69  As a result, and confirming past police 
practice in Canada, McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. held that section 10(b) 
will normally only entitle a detainee to a single consultation with counsel, 
with further consultation permitted only when there has been a “material 
change in the detainee’s situation”.70  
 And in Clayton, the Court was asked to clarify the scope of the new 
power of investigative detention that, using the common law police 
powers doctrine (or “Waterfield test”71) it had created in R. v. Mann.72  
Whereas the power as articulated in Mann appeared narrowly 
circumscribed, subject to Parliament legislating to enlarge it, the majority 
in Clayton expanded the power to allow investigative detention whenever 
it is “reasonably necessary” in the “totality of the circumstances.”73  In his 
dissenting reasons in the 1985 case of Dedman v. The Queen, Dickson C.J.C. 
had explained that “[s]hort of arrest, the police have never possessed legal 
authority at common law to detain any one against his or her will for 
                                                     
66 Id., at para. 53. 
67 A rule that, it should be noted, the majority of the Court made significantly more difficult for 
the police to breach in Spencer earlier that year. 
68 Sinclair, supra note 63, at para. 30. 
69 Id., at para. 47. 
70 Id., at para. 43. 
71 R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.). 
72 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.). 
73 Clayton, supra note 64, at para. 30. 
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questioning or to pursue an investigation.”74  With Clayton, and despite 
deep and abiding societal concerns surrounding police practices of racial 
profiling, the world described by Dickson C.J.C. was firmly in the rear-
view mirror.   
 The significance of these cases for present purposes is not that they 
participate in a substantive countercurrent, standing in contrast with the 
Court’s more skeptical posture towards criminalization and punishment.  
Rather, most notable is that these decisions seem to lack key elements of 
the virtue of judicial humility that I have argued were central to the 
criminal justice cases of Winko, Khan, and Ferguson.  The keen attentiveness 
to the workings of power, and the particular vulnerabilities of those 
subject to it, that was so prominent in McLachlin C.J.C.’s reasoning in 
Winko and Khan is troublingly absent from these three police powers 
decisions.  Indeed, thinking through power and vulnerability in the 
criminal justice system, and the Court’s responsibility in light of both, was 
central to the Court’s reasoning in Bedford, Carter, Insite, and Ipeelee.  Yet in 
Singh and Sinclair, a formal approach to choice displaces careful attention 
to the ways in which the radical asymmetries of power in the interrogation 
room might structure an accused’s choices, and might do so especially for 
those who are themselves less powerful, less informed, or less resilient.  By 
the light of these cases, the dominance enjoyed by police in the 
interrogation room is not especially important to the right to silence, and 
the right to counsel is not about correcting power imbalances.  And in 
Clayton, the experience of over-policing and profiling that is so central to 
racialized communities’ experience of the criminal justice system does not 
feature in the majority’s analysis, counselling a more cautious approach to 
the expansion of police authority, as it should.  Indeed, the expansion of 
police powers using the common law in Clayton sits in tension with Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s desire in Ferguson for the Court to occupy its 
distinctive space, thereby calling on Parliament to wrestle with its own role 
and choices, as well as the Khan Court’s critical engagement with history 
in light of present systemic realities.  The effect of these three cases is to 
locate the Court in a deferential role in relationship with police power and 
need.  In short, these cases seem to lack the attentiveness to power, 
vulnerability, and the role of others, as well as the consequences of one’s 
                                                     
74 [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 13 (S.C.C.). 
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choices in light of all of this, that is essential to understanding and 
accepting one’s appropriate place in relationship with others: the defining 
feature of humility, richly understood. 
  Perhaps the most generous reading of these cases is that there is a 
brand of humility at work in them.  The field of police powers is one in 
which the rights of the individual and the safety of the public are in overt 
tension.  The choices facing the courts in such cases have enormous 
consequences for each side of this dynamic.  And met with this, it is 
perhaps tempting to occupy less judicial space, resiling from bolder 
positions and leaving room for others to do their work without judicial 
interference and in response to perceived need.  But this is the form of 
humility exercised by Rabbi Zechariah and to which the Talmud so 
strenuously objects.  So what would a genuinely humble jurisprudence of 
police powers look like?  One informed by the richer sense of humility that 
I have developed here?  Its starting point would be attention to the power 
enjoyed by police and the vulnerability of those subject to that power.  It 
would involve a judiciary respectfully but critically engaged with the 
common law and past police practice, but attuned to the courts’ 
overwhelming responsibility to ensure that the law is adapted to serve the 
peculiar concerns and interests of the communities that it affects today.  It 
would see a judiciary assuming positions on police powers that call on 
others — police and Parliament alike — to occupy their own space 
responsibly.  And resources for this humble posture towards police 
powers are available in Chief Justice McLachlin’s broader work.   
 
CONCLUSION: DUTIES OF THE HEART 
 
 We can do so much better than seeking to understand the very 
complex role of a judge and of a court by examining matters through the 
lens of “judicial activism”.  Picking up that lens, we are apt to see the 
responsibilities and roles of the judge very thinly, indeed.  Within this 
frame, our ethical antennae are tuned to the risk that a court will do too 
much, and as a result the principal counsel is one of restraint.  This is a 
pallid image of what we ask of a judge.  In search of a language that better 
captures our hopes for the judicial role, the virtue of humility is an 
appealing offer.  But I have argued in this piece that our understanding of 
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the virtue of humility should not be one solely associated with being 
“smaller” or constructed as a counterpoint to arrogance.  Understood only 
in that way, I’m not certain that we have made much of an advance on 
“activism” in respect of the complexity with which we see the judge’s role.  
Instead, I have urged a conception of humility as the effort to occupy one’s 
appropriate place in relationship with others.  We will continue to disagree 
about whether this conception of humility was realized in a given case, 
and that is fine and good because it offers a richer language in which to 
discuss what qualities we wish to see in those who exercise the judicial 
role.  And this understanding of humility indeed encodes much that I 
think we want from our judges: the enormous goods of compassion, 
willingness to learn, acceptance of fallibility, yes; but also responsibility, 
attentiveness to power and vulnerability, and courage.  Understood in this 
way, humility seems a foundational virtue, a pathway to other ethical 
goods, other virtues we would ask of our judges. 
 Rabbi Bachya ibn Pakuda thought so.  He was a rabbi and 
philosopher who lived in Al-Andalus in the 11th century.  His project was 
to generate the first systematic vision of Jewish ethics and his masterwork 
was a volume entitled The Duties of the Heart.75  In that book, Rabbi Bachya 
poses the question, “on what do the [other] virtues depend?”  His answer?  
“All virtues and duties are dependent on humility.”76  It seems to me that 
this is because humility is, at core, a question of one’s relationship with 
others.  Aware of others — attuned to their needs, experiences, 
vulnerabilities, and our responsibilities in relation to each — we should 
seek to occupy no more but also no less space than is appropriate.  And if 
humility, so understood, is indeed the foundational virtue, this brings us 
into conversation with another, more modern, tradition of Jewish thought: 
that ethics is generated out of the encounter with the other and from the 
experience of being awash in the richness of their specificity and the 
flooding complexity of their lived experience.77 
                                                     
75 R Bachya ben Joseph ibn Paquda, Duties of the Heart, translated by Moses Hyamson 
(Jerusalem and New York: Feldheim Publishers, 1978), at 111. 
76 Translation drawn from Morinis, supra note 20, at 46.   
77 See, e.g., Martin Buber, I and Thou, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Scribner, 
1970); Emmanuel Lévinas, Ethics and infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985). 
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 Beverley McLachlin’s jurisprudence is marked by that awareness of 
others and sense of responsibility towards them.  In her judgments, one 
finds a deep and abiding desire to understand the complex ways that 
people find themselves in the world and a genuine wrestling with what 
this means for the role of a judge.  That interest in people’s condition in 
our society, and concern with law’s role in making that condition better — 
or at least not allowing it to make things worse — is an ethical instinct that 
has animated her contributions to Canadian law.  Winko, Khan, Ferguson, 
and a host of other cases are evidence of this.  And where I have critiqued 
her decisions, it has been out of respect for this instinct and my sense that 
it could have been better realized in a given case.  We can ask for little more 
than a judge who has insistently asked the question of the appropriate 
space for a court to occupy in light of power, vulnerability, and the role of 
others, and in so doing to have offered us resources for thinking more 
deeply about the virtue of humility.   
